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Resumo Num cenário em que as redes hotspot estão a ser progressivamente mais
usadas e presentes e a obter mais subscritores, com a quantidade de informa-
ção sensível que neste tipo de redes é transmitida e com a variedade destes
mesmos utilizadores que podem ser ou não de confiança, são necessários
mecanismos de segurança que garantam a confidencialidade e integridade
de dados, assim como garantir que redes anunciadas sejam autenticadas,
evitando redes malignas. Os captive portals, portais providenciados por re-
des deste tipo onde se efetua log in, são ainda um maior risco pois implicam a
transmissão de dados sensíveis de maneira não standard. Este trabalho ex-
plora as fraquezas deste paradigma e apresenta uma solução que pretende
colmatá-las, baseada na arquitetura 802.1X. Esta solução passa por criar uma
extensão do protocolo EAP a fim de poder integrar a autenticação via HTTP
com o processo de autenticação do 802.1X.

Keywords 802.1X, EAP, TLS, security, networks, hotspots, captive portals.
Abstract In a scenario where hotspot networks are increasingly being used, present
and obtaining more subscribers, with the amount of sensitive information ex-
changed on this type of networks and with the variety of their users, which
may not be trustworthy, there is a need of implementing security mechanisms
that guarantee data confidentiality and integrity, as well as to guarantee that
announced networks are genuine, avoiding rogue networks. Captive por-
tals are portals provided by networks of this type where a user logs in; they
are a greater risk as they imply the transmission of sensitive data on a non-
standardized way. This work explores the weaknesses of this paradigm and
describes a solution that intends to suppress them, based on the 802.1X archi-
tecture. This solution consists on creating an EAP-compliant protocol in order
to integrate an HTTP-based authentication within the 802.1X authentication
framework.

Contents
Contents i
List of Figures iii
List of Tables v
Glossary vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Context 5
2.1 Extensible Authentication Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 EAP: Packet Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 EAP: Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.3 EAP: Generic EAP Conversation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 IEEE 802.1X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 802.1X: Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 802.1X: Controlled and Uncontrolled Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.3 802.1X: Authentication Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.4 How Linux uses 802.1X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Captive Portals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Security Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.3 Captive Portal Engines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.4 ChilliSpot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3 Related Work 21
3.1 Secure MAC-layer Protocol for Captive Portals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Hotspot 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3 Apple’s Captive Portal Assistant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 Architecture 23
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2 Extensible Authentication Protocol for Secure Hotspots . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.1 EAP-SH: Message Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.2 EAP-SH: Flowchart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
i
4.2.3 EAP-SH: Certificate Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2.4 EAP-SH: Detailed Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5 Implementation 39
5.1 WPA Supplicant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.1.1 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.1.2 Data structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.1.3 EAP-SH Supplicant States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.1.4 Fragmentation and Defragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.2 RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2.1 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2.2 Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2.3 EAP-SH Server States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2.4 HTTP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6 Security Analysis 55
6.1 Dolev-Yao Model Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.1.1 Rogue Access Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1.2 Client Certificate Owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1.3 Server Certificate Owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1.4 Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1.5 Captive Portal Circumvention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.1.6 Captive Portal Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7 Conclusion 59
References 61
ii
List of Figures
2.1 EAP Packet structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Example of an EAP Conversation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 802.1X Basic Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Example of an 802.1X Authentication Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 ChilliSpot Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6 ChilliSpot Authentication Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 EAP-TLS Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2 Modified EAP-TLS Flags byte for the first stage of the protocol . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 EAP-SH Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4 EAP-SH Flags byte for the second stage of the protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.5 EAP-SH Flowchart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.6 EAP-SH Certification Hierarchy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.7 EAP-SH Phase 1 Message Exchange - Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.8 EAP-SH Phase 1 Message Exchange - Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.9 EAP-SH Phase 2 - HTTP Protocol Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.10 EAP-SH Phase 2 Message Exchange - Captive Portal Login Success . . . . . . . 36
4.11 EAP-SH Phase 2 Message Exchange - Certificate Signing and Install . . . . . . . 37
5.1 EAP-SH: Supplicant State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2 EAP-SH: RADIUS State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3 Implemented Captive Portal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
iii

List of Tables
2.1 EAP Method Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
v

Glossary
AP Access Point
BSS Basic Service Set
CA Certification Authority
CHAP Challenge-Handshake Authentication
Protocol
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSR Certificate Signing Request
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DNS Domain Name System
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAPoL EAP over LAN
EAPoW EAP over Wireless
GUI Graphical User Interface
EAP-SH Extensible Authentication Protocol
for Secure Hotspots
HTML HyperText Markup Language
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
ISP Internet Service Provider
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC Medium Access Control
MSK Master Session Key
MTU Maximum Transmission Unit
Nak Not Acknowledged
OSCP Online Certificate Status Protocol
OSA Open System Authentication
PKG Private Key Generator
PPP Point-to-Point Protocol
PSK Pre-Shared Key
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User
Service
SOHO Small Office / Home Office
SSID Service Set Identifier
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
URL Uniform Resource Locator
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
WLAN Wireless LAN
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
WPA2 IEEE 802.11i
vii

One
Introduction
This chapter intends to give a brief introduction to the thesis, describing the problem at
stake and the objectives of this work.
’The way to get started is to quit talking and begin doing’, Walt Disney
1.1 Motivation
In the last century, developers and system designers always had the concern of
developing new technologies to allow improvements on every other area. The truth is
that it was quite successful and many other subjects benefited from this, for example,
medicine and finances. The biggest problem, which was the least of concerns for who
developed these systems, were the security considerations taken into account, which
were almost none. As years passed by, new vulnerabilities were discovered and new
systems considered such vulnerabilities when being designed and implemented.
Computer security had its origin in the military field. Nowadays, as technology
advances, it also comes with a growing concern with security issues of existent and new
network and data systems, in terms of some aspects:
1. Confidentiality, the property of making information not available to unauthorized
entities;
2. Integrity, the property of maintaining and assuring the non-modification of infor-
mation without authorization;
3. Availability, the property of making information available to legitimate users,
when they request for it;
4. Authentication, the property of assuring the legitimacy of a user;
5. Non-repudiation, the property of assuring that a neutral third-party can be
convinced that an event did or did not occur.
The Internet is no exception. The amount of sensitive information that everyday
circulates through it is enormous, and it is tending to grow as time passes. Additionally,
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not only transmitted information is at stake but also information stored in end-user’s
workstations and servers.
Public hotspots are networks of easy access, hence their usefulness. Also, their
usage increases everyday, as well as the number of their subscribers. However, they are
really dangerous when it comes to the transmission of sensitive information. This type
of network usually comes with a plug-in, captive portals, which are web portals that
allow a user to have access to the network as long as he has an account associated to
the Internet Service Provider managing that network. On this case:
1. Clients traffic is not encrypted, and therefore can be captured in clear text by
eavesdroppers;
2. Traffic to/from clients does not have any integrity control, and therefore man-in-
the-middle attacks can be performed;
3. Clients and machines, together, can be fooled by rogue access points.
4. Clients can abuse the network through tunnels over protocols that are left open,
such as DNS.
This thesis intends to solve those problems through the presented solution.
1.2 Objectives
This work’s objective was to adapt the captive portals’ paradigm to the 802.1X
architecture, in order to solve the problems referred in section 1.1, namely traffic
encryption, integrity control and mutual authentication. In detail, the objectives of
this thesis are the following:
1. Comprehensive study to understand how captive portals work, and how authenti-
cation is performed on each of its many engines;
2. Study of the base principles of the EAP meta protocol, as well as how in Linux
are EAP methods explored on the supplicant side, the client end of an 802.1X
access architecture;
3. Design of a new EAP method to fit into the captive portal paradigm, to allow
mutual authentication, preventing rogue access points and to allow client authen-
tication, as well as to incorporate an encrypted tunnel to allow sensitive data to
be protected and its integrity assured;
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4. Development of a prototype in Linux that implements this EAP method design,
both in the EAP client side (supplicant) and in the EAP server side (authentication
server).
1.3 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, the state of the art is
presented, namely all EAP features, EAP packet structure, some EAP methods and
its pros and cons and also a generic EAP conversation to show how EAP is processed.
802.1X is described in detail, its architecture, how it works and how does Linux make
use of 802.1X on its supplicant side. Lastly, on the last section captive portals are
explained, how they can be implemented and their security limitations, as well as some
existing captive portal software access controllers and a case study of ChilliSpot, one of
the captive portal engines.
In chapter 3, some related work is presented, which means solutions that already
exist and somehow are related to this work. Firstly, a secure captive portal solution
is going to be described, which uses a MAC-layer solution. Secondly, Hotspot 2.0, a
new standard for public-access Wi-Fi that enables seamless roaming between Wi-Fi
networks. Finally, the exploitation of a captive portal circumvention solution, Captive
Portal Assistant, developed by Apple.
In chapter 4, the first pages present an overview of the solution and its purpose,
followed by the detailed description of the solution distributed in five topics. The
first topic overviews the protocol, and the next four topics describe its message
structure, namely its fields and what are they for, a detailed flowchart about the whole
authentication process, a detailed description of the certification infrastructure as well
as a detailed description of the whole architecture’s operation.
Chapter 5 presents the solution’s implementation, describes the supplicant side
and the server side implementations, and how they work when authentication is in
progress.
Chapter 6 presents a security analysis based on Dolev-Yao Model conditions. It
describes different scenarios in which an attacker would impersonate entities such as
the client, the authenticator and the captive portal, and how the protocol defends itself
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from these scenarios.
Finally, chapter 7 presents a conclusion about the discussed problem, the solution’s
description and advantages and future work perspectives.
4
Two
Context
This chapter intends to describe the state-of-the-art related with EAP, 802.1X and
Captive Portals.
’The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step’, Lao Zi
2.1 Extensible Authentication Protocol
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [1] is a meta protocol designed to encap-
sulate authentication mechanisms and it is used in wireless networks (e.g. 802.1X [2]) and
point-to-point connections (e.g. PPP [3]). This protocol does not have any security by
itself, therefore the authentication method that it encapsulates must implement its own
security. To this day, there are approximately 40 EAP authentication methods in use [4].
EAP has two main features: it provides a typed message exchange (there are
only 4 types of messages, explained further below) and it provides extensibility, as said.
The authentication methods are dynamically selected in a negotiation made between
the authenticating peers, which is performed separately from any other action on the
EAP data.
The requirements of EAP authentication methods for Wireless LANs, defined in
RFC 4107 [5], are important to make the protocol have some security considerations in
its designing, though not mandatory. These include:
1. Mutual authentication, which should be resistant to man-in-the-middle and
dictionary attacks;
2. Guarantee the generation and distribution of a master secret key to both parties
(supplicant and authenticator);
3. Protect the identity of supplicants.
In 802.1X, EAP is used to free the Access Point (AP), which is the authenticator, from
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the burden of managing some of the particular aspects of the adopted authentication
protocol, and so the authentication is managed by an authentication server. Using this
methodology, it is possible to change the authentication method without changing the
AP software. Such EAP-based feature made the use of several authentication methods
in corporate networks possible, besides the common username-password model [4].
2.1.1 EAP: Packet Structure
All EAP messages have a common format, as described in RFC 3748 [1]. The figure
below represents the packet structure of EAP messages. The fields are transmitted
from left to right.
0 7 8 15 16 23 24 31
Code (1 byte) Identifier (1 byte) Length (2 bytes)
Type (1 byte)
}
EAP
Header
Payload (0+ bytes)
Figure 2.1: EAP Packet structure
The Code field has a size of one byte and represents the type of the EAP packet. EAP
Codes are assigned as follows:
• Code 1 - EAP Request : This type of packet is sent by the authenticator to the
supplicant. Request packets (with the same Identifier field) are sent until a valid
EAP Response or a lower layer failure is received. Optionally, a retry counter can
be configured;
• Code 2 - EAP Response : This type of packet is sent by the supplicant to the
authenticator in reply to an EAP Request. The Response matches the Request
Identifier field which it replies to;
• Code 3 - EAP Success : This type of packet is sent by the authenticator to the
supplicant, after completing the authentication mechanism in progress, to indicate
the first has done a successful authentication to the latter. This type of packet
contains no Payload field.
• Code 4 - EAP Failure : This type of packet is sent by the authenticator to the
supplicant, after completing the authentication protocol in progress, to indicate
an unsuccessful authentication. This type of packet contains no Payload field.
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The Identifier field has a size of one byte and is unique for each pair Request-Response,
for the whole duration of the EAP conversation. This means that the EAP Response
Identifier field is always the same as the current Request’s. If they don’t match, the
authenticator discards the Response.
The Length field has a size of two bytes and represents the length, in bytes, of
the whole EAP packet to which it pertains, including both header and payload.
The Type field has a size of one byte and identifies the type of authentication
mechanism that is being used or to be used during the EAP conversation. The EAP
Response Type field might be different from the Request, in which case indicates that
a Type is unacceptable to the supplicant, sending a Nak (Not Acknowledged). The
initial definition included methods such as MD5-Challenge, One Time Password and
Generic Token Card, but currently there are many more1.
The Payload field has a size of zero or more bytes and its content varies with
the authentication mechanism, or more specifically, the Type field. This field does not
exist if the Code field is Success or Failure.
2.1.2 EAP: Methods
As said, EAP is a meta protocol that encapsulates authentication mechanisms, or EAP
methods. The most commonly used methods include EAP-TLS [6], EAP-TTLS [7],
EAP-PEAP [8], EAP-LEAP2, EAP-SIM [9] and EAP-AKA [10]. The methods differ in
aspects such as usability, efficiency, flexibility, and many others.
Table 2.1 presents the cons and pros of such EAP methods.
1https://www.ietf.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xml#eap-numbers-4
2http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/
aironet-1200-series/prod_qas0900aecd801764f1.html
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Table 2.1: EAP Method Comparison
EAP-Type Advantages Disadvantages
EAP-TLS
Mutual authentication
through certificates;
Blocking user via certificate
revocation;
Lack of user identity protec-
tion;
User certificate configura-
tion is necessary
EAP-TTLS
Mutual authentication;
Allows the client to authen-
ticate himself with any au-
thentication method (not
only EAP);
EAP-PEAP
Mutual authentication;
Client identity protection on
phase 2;
Allows the client to authenti-
cate himself using any EAP,
in a secure channel;
EAP-AKA
Mutual authentication;
Client authenticates with
USIM;
Secure PPP authentication
model;
RADIUS needs access to
HLR;
EAP-SIM
Mutual authentication;
Client authenticates with
SIM from GSM;
Network impersonation (if
some GSM triplets are
known);
Some A3/A8 algorithms
have vulnerabilities;
2.1.3 EAP: Generic EAP Conversation
As shown in Figure 2.2, the conversation starts when the authenticator issues an Identity
Request as the initial Request to the supplicant, querying the identity of the latter, to
which it sends an Identity Response, containing an identity, used to uniquely identify
the supplicant. After that, the authenticator sends an EAP Request containing an
EAP Method Type and the supplicant can reply in two ways. It can reply with an EAP
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Response of the same type, in which case the pair Request-Response are transmitted
as many times as needed to conclude the authentication mechanism (the number of
exchanges depends on the EAP method being used). Otherwise, it can reply with a
Nak, indicating that the Type solicited by the authenticator is unacceptable to the
supplicant and through which it also requests a Type that the supplicant itself accepts,
and the authentication proceeds with consequent exchanging of Request-Response
pairs. Either way, an EAP Success or EAP Failure message is transmitted at the end,
indicating a successful or failed authentication.
Supplicant Authenticator
Identity Request
Identity Response
EAP Request
EAP Response with the same type or a Nak
...
...
EAP Success or EAP Failure message
Figure 2.2: Example of an EAP Conversation
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2.2 IEEE 802.1X
IEEE 802.1X is an IEEE standard used for port-based network access control [4]. It
provides a mechanism for devices to authenticate themselves in LANs or WLANs, based
on EAP. This standard allows mutual authentication to be performed for both end-user
station (supplicant) and the network, as well as the generation and distribution of
session keys, and it was originally conceived for corporate cabled networks, and later
extended for wireless networks.
2.2.1 802.1X: Entities
The 802.1X authentication generally involves three intervening parties (see Figure 2.3):
• Supplicant: equipment that intends to attach to the LAN/WLAN. It can be a
piece of software that provides credentials to the authenticator;
• Authenticator: network device (e.g. an Access Point) that controls the state
of the supplicant’s access port to the network. It acts as a safety guard to the
protected network;
• Authentication Server: central server that leads the mutual authentication process
between supplicants and the network (e.g. RADIUS).
Client (Supplicant)
Access Point (Authenticator)
Authentication Server
Figure 2.3: 802.1X Basic Architecture
2.2.2 802.1X: Controlled and Uncontrolled Ports
The 802.1X terminology defines that for every authentication session there are two logi-
cal ports on the authenticator that control the access to the network. The uncontrolled
port does not impose any restriction in terms of data exchange through it, but only
allows traffic to be sent and received to perform authentication and key distribution,
to and from the authentication server. The controlled port has distinct states and
depending on what state it is currently on, it allows or not traffic to go through it:
• Authorized state: allows network traffic to ingress to or egress from the controlled
port;
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• Unauthorized state: prevents network traffic to ingress to or egress from the
controlled port;
The controlled port is initially on "unauthorized" state and upon a successful 802.1X
authentication process, it changes its state to "authorized", allowing the end-user
station to communicate with the network normally.
2.2.3 802.1X: Authentication Process
In WLANs, when a supplicant associates with an access point, it is bound to two
802.1X logical ports, uncontrolled and controlled port. After the 802.1X authentication,
the communication between the supplicant and the network behind the access point is
done through the controlled port. This type of authentication is done along three main
stages (see Figure 2.4):
1. 802.11 Discovery and Association: On this stage, the supplicant connects to
the access point, with the normal 802.11 process of network discovery, OSA
authentication and association between the supplicant and the access point. At
the end, the controlled port remains in the "unauthorized" state;
2. EAP Authentication/Dialogue: On this stage, the supplicant sends an EAPoW
Start (for wireless networks) and EAP messages are exchanged, including the
Identity exchange as well as pairs EAP Request-Response and RADIUS Request-
Challenge, until the EAP method is completed, with an EAP Success or Failure
Message. Generally, on this stage occurs mutual authentication and session
key distribution between the supplicant and the authentication server. The
authenticator relays the dialog between these two entities, which is the only traffic
allowed on the uncontrolled port. In the end, the controlled port remains in the
"unauthorized" state.
The EAP messages must be encapsulated to be allowed to be transmitted between
parties. In 802.1X, as we can see in Figure 2.4, between the supplicant and
the authenticator, EAP messages are encapsulated in EAPoL frames (EAP over
LAN), or more precisely, EAPoW frames (EAP over Wireless). Between the
authenticator and the authentication server, EAP messages are encapsulated
within an application protocol (e.g. RADIUS).
3. Four-Way Handshake: On this stage occurs mutual authentication and session key
distribution between the supplicant and the authenticator. It involves exchanging
four messages and in the end, if every step was successful, the controlled port
changes to the "authorized" state. This phase is important because the distribution
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of session keys guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of the end-user data in
the supplicant-AP wireless link.
As soon as the controlled port is on the "authorized" state, the end-user is granted
access to the network by the authenticator.
Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server
802.11 Association
802.11 Association
EAPoW Start
EAP Identity Request
EAP Identity Response
RADIUS Access Request (EAP)
RADIUS Access Challenge (EAP)
EAP Request (Challenge)
EAP Response (Chal. Response)
RADIUS Access Request
RADIUS Access Accept
EAP Success
4-Way Handshake
4-Way Handshake
Figure 2.4: Example of an 802.1X Authentication Process
2.2.4 How Linux uses 802.1X
As explained, a supplicant is the entity that seeks to be authenticated in order to
connect to a particular network. In Linux the piece of software that plays this role
is wpa_supplicant. This piece of software is a cross-platform (Linux, Mac OS X and
Windows) supplicant with support for WEP, WPA and WPA2 and was designed to
be a daemon program, i.e., program that runs in background. It implements key
negotiation with a WPA authenticator and it controls the roaming and IEEE 802.11
authentication/association of the wireless driver3. Besides supporting WPA features, it
3https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/WPA_supplicant
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supports almost every known EAP method. Wpa_supplicant also includes a text-based
frontend (wpa_cli) and a GUI (wpa_gui)4.
4http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/
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2.3 Captive Portals
A hotspot is a physical location that offers Internet access over a WLAN through
the use of a router connected to an Internet Service Provider (ISP). Due to the lack
of applicable MAC-layer security solutions, current 802.11 hotspots have one of two
security strategies. The first strategy is to use no security whatsoever. This is common
for small establishments. The second strategy is to use a captive portal.
A captive portal is a special web page shown before using the Internet normally
and it is generally used to present a login page. This is done by a router or a gateway
host that does not allow traffic to pass before the user authenticates or performs a
specific action.
There are at least three ways of using a captive portal. The first limits access
to a set of known users defined generally by a username and a password. The
second requires payment before allowing the traffic to pass. The third simply dis-
plays the terms of use, to which the user has to comply with, before being granted access.
Generally, a captive portal’s operation [11] is defined by the following steps:
1. The supplicant receives an IP address from a DHCP server via the wireless link
(as open networks normally do);
2. Traffic is blocked, except the traffic to and from the captive portal server;
3. Any web traffic is redirected to the captive portal server;
4. A web page displaying terms of use, billing information, login screen, or a combi-
nation of these is returned;
5. After performing the adequate action, the traffic in unblocked and the user is
granted access to the network.
2.3.1 Implementations
This type of paradigm implies the existence of an engine capable of redirecting
all traffic to the captive portal server. This piece of architecture may reside on
an access point or on a dedicated server. Additionally, the captive portal engine
might communicate with a back-end server which stores the users and associated in-
formation (e.g. LDAP, RADIUS). There are many ways of implementing this paradigm.
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ICMP Redirect
ICMP redirects are messages sent to the hosts that notify about an alternative route
and so updates their routing information (to follow the route they announce). This
way, a supplicant’s traffic can be redirected as long as it is not authenticated.
HTTP Redirect
An HTTP Redirect is a message sent by a web server, generally in response to an HTTP
GET, instructing the web browser to request for another URL, instead of the originally
requested. In this case, the web browser receives as response an HTTP Redirect from
the captive portal engine that will always redirect it to the captive portal’s web server.
Redirection by DNS (DNS Spoofing)
When a supplicant requests a website, the captive portal engine will make sure that
only the DNS server provided by DHCP can be queried by the unauthenticated client or
alternatively forward all the DNS requests to a determined DNS server. This DNS server
will always return the IP address of the captive portal page as a result of any DNS lookup.
2.3.2 Security Limitations
Depending on the implementations, a captive portal engine can have many limitations
in terms of security. Many portals have confidentiality problems, some do not encrypt
usernames and passwords whilst others only encrypt these (through TLS tunnelling)
during the authentication phase, and thus transmit all succeeding data in clear
text. This is done since hotspot operators leave to users the protection of their own
communications and many times without informing them.
Another limitation is related with the maintenance of the authenticated session.
After an authentication, some implementations allow traffic to pass through the gateway
based on IP and MAC addresses. Once an IP and MAC address are found to be authenti-
cated, any listener can spoof these addresses and be allowed a route through the gateway.
2.3.3 Captive Portal Engines
There are many control systems for implementing a portal-based network access control,
either open source or paid, each one with its advantages and drawbacks. Some of them
are:
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1. CoovaChilli: Simple open-source software access controller based on the deprecated
ChilliSpot project. It uses RADIUS for access provisioning and accounting5;
2. WifiDog: Open-source software access controller that allows users to create a
working account directly through the captive portal, granting them 15 minutes to
confirm an email. It also records statistics regarding the network and users using
it. It allows bandwidth limiting per class, per router and port blocking. It also
allows the enforcement of policies based on time of day6;
3. Untangle: Open-source software access controller that is very flexible in terms of
configuration. Besides having a good GUI for configuration, it allows the captive
portal to be displayed only to a subset of the network, or by the user operating
system, or by device type, or even define an interval of time on which the portal
is required. It also allows the specification of rules to capture or pass traffic and a
very easy way to customize the captive portal page7;
4. WhizzWifi: Payed software access controller, easy to install and to use, that
besides offering the possibility of configuring almost every aspect of a captive
portal management system, records analytics, which is very useful for enterprise
clients8;
5. Facepoint: Payed software access controller that not only offers the most varied
analytics (including real time user statistics) but also the possibility of logging in
with social network accounts through the captive portal page9;
These are some solutions but there are other that use different access control techniques
and have different features. On Section 2.3.4, we describe with more detail how one of
these systems work, ChilliSpot. ChilliSpot is an open source captive portal engine, used
for authenticating users of a wireless LAN and it supports web-based login, which is a
de facto standard for public hotspot authentication. The authentication, authorization
and accounting is handled by a RADIUS server.
2.3.4 ChilliSpot
In this section we describe an experiment done in order to illustrate, for real communi-
cations, the behaviour of ChilliSpot.
5https://coova.github.io/CoovaChilli/
6http://dev.wifidog.org/wiki/Features
7https://www.untangle.com/shop/captive-portal/
8http://whizzwifi.com/#features
9http://www.facepoint.me/wifi-hotspot.html
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Client
Access Point
RADIUS Server HTTP Server
Figure 2.5: ChilliSpot Architecture
For this experiment we used a common terminal, an access point, a RADIUS server
and an HTTP server. These two servers were installed in the same physical machine.
The access point had a Linux-based firmware installed, DD-WRT, which includes,
among its many features, a ChilliSpot engine, along with other captive portal engines,
such as Sputnik10 and WifiDog11. The AP serves as a mediator for the Internet access,
generating the challenges for authentication, serving as a redirector and controlling the
authentication session for each terminal that intends to have access to the Internet.
The RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) server is a piece of
equipment that provides centralized Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA). In this case, it only provides authentication, storing in its database the users
that have access to the Internet. For this, it was installed a popular open-source
RADIUS server, FreeRADIUS and also an open-source database management system,
MySQL, to store user information.
The HTTP server is a server that provides the captive portal page. For implementing
this server, it was installed an Apache server along with an HTTPS configuration to
ensure that every message exchanged between the terminal and this server was over
TLS (to protect usernames and passwords, as well as responses to challenges).
10http://www.sputnik.com/
11http://dev.wifidog.org/
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Authentication Process
In order to know how ChilliSpot works, we performed an authentication while capturing
all the traffic in order to analyse the exchanged packets, as shown on Figure 2.6.
First the supplicant sends an HTTP GET, through the browser, to an URL dif-
ferent from the captive portal’s (with the intention of accessing some Internet services).
The access point answers the supplicant with an HTTP response with a status code
302, which is a temporary redirection to another location. That location is an URL to
the captive portal login page. Included on this URL is a 16-byte challenge, generated
randomly by the ChilliSpot engine installed on the AP.
After this step, the supplicant’s browser sends an HTTP GET to the provided
captive portal login URL, along with the challenge, and the HTTP server replies back
an OK message with the login page.
After introducing the credentials, the supplicant transmits an HTTP POST that
includes the username and the password, as well as the same previous challenge. The
server sends back a “Login Result URL" in an OK message which contains a response
to the challenge as well as the username. This response is made with the following
operations:
md5(password, challenge_enc_with_uamsecret)
The password is the user’s one. The access point and the HTTP server share a secret
that only they know, uamsecret, and the challenge is encoded with this key. Uamsecret
is a parameter used to encrypt the CHAP-Challenge and the CHAP-Response when
it is transferred from the HTTP server to ChilliSpot. This secret is used to prevent
dictionary attacks. Also, RADIUS server and Chillispot share a secret key. This key is
used to transmit the Challenge and Challenge Response.
The OK message sent by the HTTP server contains HTML meta elements to in-
struct the web browser to automatically refresh the current page after a given time
interval, to a given URL (Login Result URL), creating a timed client-side redirection.
This is known as meta refresh12. As a consequence, the supplicant sends an HTTP GET
to the “Login Result URL" (which is sent the ChilliSpot engine to process, on the AP)
and the RADIUS authentication process begins. The ChilliSpot engine sends an Access
12https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta_refresh
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Request to the RADIUS server, which includes the username and the CHAP-Password,
the response to the previous sent challenge. Based on this information, the RADIUS
server sends an Access Reject, if the response is not according to what is expected, or
an Access Accept, on the other case.
In case of an Access Reject is sent, the access point redirects the supplicant to
a failed login page, along with a completely new random challenge, so the process might
repeat again.
In case of an Access Accept, the access point redirects the supplicant to a suc-
cessful login page and then to the original requested page.
Client AP w/ Chillispot Apache Server RADIUS Server External Server
GET (google.com)
302: Moved Temporarily
GET (challenge)
OK (data)
POST (user and password)
OK (user and chall. resp.)
GET (user and chall. resp.)
Access Request (chall. resp.)
Access Accept
302: Moved Temporarily
GET (google.com)
Figure 2.6: ChilliSpot Authentication Process
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Three
Related Work
This chapter intends to describe some similar solutions related to the exposed problem.
’We can not solve our problems with the same level of thinking that created them’, Albert
Einstein
3.1 Secure MAC-layer Protocol for Captive Portals
Wi-Fi hotspots are open for public access, and for that reason these environments are
not conducive for sharing login credentials or secret key information between the client
and the access point. On this solution, the key establishment between client and AP is
made using hierarchical identity-based cryptography [12].
Identity-based cryptography is a type of public key cryptography in which an
entity’s public key is derivable from a known aspect of its entity (e.g. an email address).
The corresponding private key is generated from a third party, called the Private Key
Generator (PKG), based on the entity’s identity. However, this requires the setup
of a secure channel between the entity and the PKG through which it can send the
private key, being the main disadvantage of this type of cryptography. Also, having
a single PKG on large network can become a bottleneck, and to solve this scalability
problem comes the Hierarchical Identity-based Cryptography, which allows a root
PKG to distribute the workload by delegating private key generation and identity
authentication to lower-level PKGs.
On this scheme, the MAC address serves as identity, and using hierarchical identity-
based cryptography, the PKG generates each user’s private key based on the user’s
MAC addresses and security parameters given by the root PKG.
This solution’s protocol [13] is presented for a client device and an access point
in a captive portal environment. The manufacturer of each wireless network interface
assigns it a unique MAC address as its public key, and the manufacturer uses its PKG
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functionality to provide the network interface with a private key corresponding to its
MAC address. This protocol uses the public key to exchange the generated private
key, which is used to establish a secure tunnel between the AP and the client device.
This scheme protects against MAC address spoofing, rogue access points and some
MAC-layer Denial-of-Service attacks.
3.2 Hotspot 2.0
Hotspot 2.0, also called HS2 or Wi-Fi Certified Passpoint, is a standard for public-access
Wi-Fi, developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance and the Wireless Broadband Association. This
standard, based on 802.11u, features seamless roaming among wireless networks and also
between wireless and cellular networks, increased bandwidth and services-on-demand to
end-users. This means that when a subscriber’s device is in range of at least one Wi-Fi
network, the device automatically connects to it and network discovery, registration,
provisioning and access processes are automated1. This standard is one possible way of
circumventing captive portals.
3.3 Apple’s Captive Portal Assistant
This is a slightly different captive portal implementation, and permits the circumvention
of captive portals. Apple’s Captive Portal Assistant is a user agent which detects when
a captive portal pops up and transparently bypasses the display of the page, against
the service’s operator, as long as they have access to the correct credentials.
1http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Hot-Spot-20-HS-20
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Four
Architecture
This chapter intends to give a perspective of the solution and its architecture.
’Those who can imagine anything, can create the impossible’, Alan Turing
4.1 Overview
The authentication on a captive portal associated to a hotspot-based network, as
referred before, is generally very insecure, since there is not a standardized secure
process to perform it. Indeed, some hotspot service providers might implement their
own security on these environments, but to the user there is no guarantee that his
transmitted data is being protected.
The solution that we developed intends to take advantage of the 802.1X archi-
tecture, and consists on the implementation of an EAP method (for the second phase
of 802.1X authentication) complemented with the captive portal paradigm. This EAP
method is performed in two stages: first the establishment of a TLS tunnel; then an
HTTP-based authentication via a captive portal. The establishment of a TLS tunnel
allows the encryption and integrity guarantee of the succeeding data, which that means
all the encapsulated HTTP packets are protected. It also assures that the network a
user is connecting to is not malicious. The HTTP-based authentication allows the user
to input his own credentials, as normally he would when authenticating to a hotspot
network with a captive portal.
Usually, each time a user intends to perform authentication, he must open the
browser, insert an URL and introduce his credentials on a captive portal. On our
solution, upon the success of an HTTP authentication, a certificate is generated, signed
by the authentication server and installed on the client. The validity of this certificate is
custom, defined by the hotspot service provider. Furthermore, the username is included
on the certificate, properly encrypted so that only the server can decrypt it, and use it
for accounting purposes, essential on these type of networks. The username encryption
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is relevant for protecting the user’s identity, since their certificates are exchanged in
cleartext. Another advantage of this protocol is that once the certificate is generated,
signed and installed on the client, there is no need of contacting the captive portal on
any other future session, as long as the certificate remains valid. This mechanism saves
time, and is more convenient to a normal user, as well as completely transparent.
AP software modification can be somehow a complex problem that needs to be
tackled by captive portals. However, for this protocol (and generally for any kind of
EAP protocol), there is no need to modify the AP software, because it already knows
how to relay EAP conversations. Then, only the end systems (client and server) need
this type of modification, in order for this protocol to work.
Moreover, the captive portal paradigm gives clients the possibility of abusing the
network through tunnels over open protocols (e.g. DNS). With our protocol, on the
contrary, it is impossible to do similar actions since, during the authentication process,
the client has no IP address and has necessarily and exclusively to dialogue with the
authentication server.
All these aspects and advantages are part of the EAP authentication mechanism
presented in the next section, Extensible Authentication Protocol for Secure Hotspots
(EAP-SH).
4.2 Extensible Authentication Protocol for Secure Hotspots
Extensible Authentication Protocol for Secure Hotspots (EAP-SH) is an EAP protocol
to be used only in architectures exploring captive portals. Its basic operation consists
of two main phases (detailed on Section 4.2.4):
1. First phase, known as the TLS phase, consists on the establishment of a TLS
tunnel (through a slightly modified EAP-TLS) between the supplicant and the
authentication server. Both sides’ authentication works with asymmetric key
pairs and public key certificates and, in case the client certificate is invalid or
non-existent, the authentication proceeds to a second phase, which runs over a
TLS tunnel created with only server-side authentication. In case the client has a
valid certificate, the authentication is performed with it;
2. Second phase, known as the Captive Portal phase, consists on the exchange of
EAP-SH-formatted messages that can either contain HTTP or certificate data, for
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the purpose of presenting to the user the login page and generating a certificate.
On this phase, all the messages circulate encrypted over the previously created
TLS tunnel. After a successful login, the user obtains a valid certificate, and the
process terminates successfully.
The whole process is completely transparent to the user, and it acts as a normal captive
portal, needing only to input his credentials and in case his certificate is still usable,
having direct access to the hotspot network.
4.2.1 EAP-SH: Message Structure
Both client and server must have a common message format to use when communicating
between themselves. On the stages where EAP-TLS messages are exchanged, the
message structure is as described on RFC 5216 [6] (Figure 4.1).
0 7 8 15 16 23 24 31 32 39
Code (1 byte)
Identifier
(1 byte)
Length (2 bytes) Type (1 byte)
}
EAP
Header
TLS Flags TLS Message Length
}
EAP-TLS
Header
TLS Payload (0+ bytes)
Figure 4.1: EAP-TLS Message Format
EAP-TLS fields are as follows:
• TLS Flags, represented on Figure 4.2, is a 1-byte field, with each bit having its
own meaning. The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the four-byte TLS
Message length field and is always set on the first fragment of a fragmented TLS
message. The M bit (more fragments) is set to indicate if more fragments are to
come, and is active on all fragments but the last. The S bit (EAP-TLS Start) is
set in an EAP-TLS Start message. The H bit, which is a bit not present in the
original EAP-TLS, is set to indicate the start of the second phase. The R bits
(reserved) are always set to zero, on this specification. Fragment acknowledges
have all of their flag bits set to zero.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
L M S H R R R R
Figure 4.2: Modified EAP-TLS Flags byte for the first stage of the protocol
• TLS Message Length is a 4-byte field and is present on the first fragment of a
fragmented TLS message, which means when the L bit is set. It provides the total
length, in number of bytes, of the full EAP-SH message that is being fragmented.
On stage 2 (Captive Portal stage), where HTTP and certificate information is exchanged
between supplicant and server, messages have a different format, though based on
EAP-TLS format. The EAP-SH message structure is shown on Figure 4.3.
0 7 8 15 16 23 24 31 32 39
Code (1 byte)
Identifier
(1 byte)
Length (2 bytes) Type (1 byte)
}
EAP
Header
EAP-SH Flags EAP-SH Message Length
}
EAP-SH
Header
EAP-SH Payload (0+ bytes)
Figure 4.3: EAP-SH Message Format
EAP-SH fields are as follows:
• EAP-SH Flags, represented on Figure 4.4, is a 1-byte field, with each bit
having its own meaning (similar to EAP-TLS). The L bit (length included)
is set to indicate the four-byte TLS Message length field and is always set
on the first fragment of a fragmented EAP-SH message. The M bit (more
fragments) is set to indicate if more fragments are to come, and is active on
all fragments but the last. The G bit is set to indicate the content of the
payload includes an HTTP request (either GET or POST) coming from the
client, and so only client EAP messages can have this flag on. For HTTP
responses, this bit is set to zero. The C bit is set when the client sends an EAP
message with its certificate signing request. The R bits (reserved) are always
set to zero by default. Fragment acknowledges have all of their flag bits set to zero.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
L M G C R R R R
Figure 4.4: EAP-SH Flags byte for the second stage of the protocol
• EAP-SH Message Length is a 4-byte field and is present on the first fragment of
a fragmented EAP-SH message, which means when the L bit is set. It provides
the total length, in number of bytes, of the full EAP-SH message that is being
fragmented.
• EAP-SH Payload is a field that can either contain HTTP information (Request
or Response) or a client’s certificate. This topic will be explained further on.
4.2.2 EAP-SH: Flowchart
The authentication process begins with the first stage. First, there is a client certificate
transmission to test if the certificate exists and it is valid. Then, EAP-TLS starts and
the authentication server sends its certificate to the client, who verifies its validity
(if the certificate has expired). If the server certificate fails the validation, EAP-TLS
terminates immediately, and the authentication process fails. The entity managing the
hotspot service has the responsibility to maintain the validity of its servers’ certificates.
In case the server certificate passes the validation, one out of two situations can happen.
In case the initial client validation is successful, the EAP-TLS proceeds with client
authentication, and terminates successfully. In case it is not, EAP-TLS proceeds only
with server authentication and a second phase begins to obtain a valid client certificate.
In either cases, a TLS tunnel is always established.
The second stage serves as a mean of obtaining a valid certificate through the
use of easier-to-manage credentials, such as usernames and passwords. This process
occurs through the previously established TLS tunnel. For this, the client asks for
the captive portal’s web page and the server answers the page back to him. As soon
as the client introduces the credentials on the web page and sends a POST with the
credentials, the server sends back one of two possible pages/results. It can send a failure
page, on which it is possible to introduce the credentials and send them again or, in
case the credentials are successfully validated, the server sends a success page back, and
in response receives a certificate signing request from the client. This certificate is then
signed by the server, which is also a Certification Authority, and then sent back to the
client. As the created certificate is valid, the authentication process ends successfully.
A flowchart representing how this authentication process works is shown on Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: EAP-SH Flowchart
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4.2.3 EAP-SH: Certificate Infrastructure
Digital certification consists on the emission of public key certificates, which are
documents with a predefined structure that contain a public key of a certain entity
and a digital signature from the issuing Certification Authority (CA). They possess an
expiration date and it can be controlled through a period of validity field indicated on
the certificate itself [4].
In the EAP-SH architecture, on the server side we have the server’s certificate,
signed by the Server Certification Authority, which in turn is signed by the Certification
Authority of the entity responsible for this service, the hotspot service provider, signed
by a Root Certification Authority, on which is self-signed and trusted. This succession
of entities makes a trustworthy certification chain. This means that for the validation of
the server’s certificate, issued by the Server’s CA, which in turn is issued by the hotspot
service provider, the public key certificate pertaining to this Server’s CA needs to be
obtained and to validate it, the public key certificate of the hotspot service provider
CA needs to be obtained, and so on, until the Root is reached, which is trusted.
A server CA belongs to a central authentication server. A central authentica-
tion server, pertains generally to a determined ISP, and it provides authentication to
a service given by this latter (e.g. Hotspot Wi-Fi). Each server should have a valid
certificate for EAP-SH to work. This means the authentication server is trusted and
should be used to login through the provided captive portal. It also means the HTTP
server from which the server obtains and transmits the captive portal is trusted. This
means that the server plays two roles:
• As a Certification Authority, signing incoming CSR’s (explained further ahead)
from clients with valid credentials;
• As a server who intends to authenticate himself towards the supplicant, having a
certificate for that purpose.
A client user wanting to authenticate himself also wishes to obtain a valid certificate,
through Certificate Signing Request (CSR)1. CSR is an encoded message that is given
to a Certification Authority when applying for a public key certificate. It is usually
generated on the machine where the certificate will be installed and contains several
information that can be included when creating it, such as city, country, email address
and name (which can also be used by the provider for statistical purposes). It also
contains a public key that will be included in the certificate. In general, it might be
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_signing_request
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considered an ’unsigned’ version of a certificate. If the supplicant does not have a
certificate or if it is not valid (as explained on Section 4.2.2), after its credentials being
validated, it sends a CSR to the authentication server. The authentication server CA
signs it, and sends it back to the client, and hence the client becomes owner of a valid
certificate, issued by the server CA.
This issued client certificate is valid during a variable number of days, defined
in the certification policy of the server CA. During this period of time, the client
is transparently validated by any hotspot related with the same ISP service, and
does not need to introduce his credentials. After this time has passed, it needs to be
authenticated again through the introduction of captive portal’s credentials.
Upon creating a CSR, the username (client’s identity) is inserted in a certificate
field (known as Subject Alternative Name) encrypted with the server’s public key. The
client’s identity goes along with the certificate when phase one of EAP-SH is occurring
and only the authentication server can decrypt it. This is used mainly for accounting
purposes, so the server knows to which client it is talking to. The Subject field can be
left empty as long as we use the Subject Alternative Name.
As for the server certificate validity, various circumstances may cause this cer-
tificate to become invalid prior to the expiration date. On this case, the certificate is
revoked. Normally, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is used to check if a certificate
was revoked. A CRL is a list of serial numbers of certificates that have been revoked by
the issuing CA before their expiration date. In this context, instead of requesting CRLs,
which can be a waste of bandwidth, Online Certificate Status Protocol (OSCP) is used.
OSCP [14] is a protocol used for obtaining the revocation status of a certificate, which
comes on an OSCP Response, a reply for a Request made to OSCP servers. However,
the client does not have any access to the network to get this response in order to
check if the server certificate revoked. To solve this problem, a TLS extension is used,
the TLS Certificate Status Request [15], also known as OSCP stapling. Such extension
allows the server to append an OSCP Response to a message of the TLS handshake,
and therefore the client does not need to contact the CA of the server certificate to get it.
Figure 4.6 shows an example of the certificate hierarchy model of the solution.
On this figure, we have two Portuguese ISPs, MEO and NOS. Their certificates are
signed by a Root CA, which might not be necessarily the same, contrary to what the
figure suggests. Each of these ISPs provides hotspot services: MEO service is MEO
Wi-Fi, and NOS service is FON_ZON_FREE_INTERNET. The credentials used to
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authenticate in a hotspot network, say MEO Wi-Fi, generate a certificate that can
be used to easily authenticate in any MEO Wi-Fi hotspot. As said before and in
order to give an example, FON_ZON_FREE_INTERNET CA certificate and the
authentication server’ certificate are located in the same central server, who acts as a
CA and as a server that needs to authenticate himself.
Root CA
MEO CA
...
NOS CA
FON_ZON_FREE_INTERNET CAMEO Wi-Fi CA
Client Certificate Server Certificate
Figure 4.6: EAP-SH Certification Hierarchy Model. The server certificate is used by
an 802.1X authentication server to authenticate itself. Note, however, that the same
server uses the credentials of its issuing CA for issuing the clients’ certificates and its
own certificate.
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4.2.4 EAP-SH: Detailed Operation
Phase One: EAP-TLS
As said before, EAP-SH starts with normal EAP-TLS operation. Stage 1 of EAP-SH
consists on the mutual authentication via TLS and if successful, EAP authentication
terminates. Figure 4.7 illustrates how EAP-TLS works when successful (note that the
client certificate request is set).
Supplicant Authentication Server
EAP Identity Response
EAP-SH Ack
EAP-SH Initial Client Certificate Transmission
EAP-TLS Start
EAP-TLS Client Hello, Cert. Status Request
EAP-TLS Server Hello, Server Cert., Client Cert. Request, Cert. Status, Server Done
EAP-TLS Client Cert., Client Key Exchange, Cert. Verifi., Change Cipher, Finished
EAP-TLS Change Cipher, Finished
EAP-TLS Ack
EAP-Success
Figure 4.7: EAP-SH Phase 1 Message Exchange - Success
Assuming an 802.1X architecture, after the 802.11 association with the authenticator
(Access Point), the client was not yet given any IP address, and so does not have any
access to the network. Then EAP authentication phase of 802.1X begins on the first
stage of EAP-SH:
1. The first message exchanged is EAP Identity Response, replying to EAP Identity
Request sent by the authenticator (though not shown on Figure 4.7);
2. The supplicant then sends its certificate on the Initial Client Certificate Trans-
mission. The server uses this message to validate the client’s certificate and here
it decides whether or not to send the Client Certificate Request. On this case,
the client’s certificate is valid;
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3. EAP-TLS Start (S bit set on TLS Flags field) is sent to indicate the start of the
EAP-TLS handshake (and for that has no data);
4. The Client Hello is a message containing a list of cipher suites (combination of
cryptographic methods) and compression methods that the clients supports. In
addition to this message, comes the Client Status Request, which is a request,
sent to the server, for the use of OSCP stapling;
5. The next message contains the Server Hello, the Server Certificate (which has
the name and public key of the server) and the Client Certificate Request. This
request is optional on EAP-TLS, but on this context it is mandatory. There is
also a Certificate Status message containing OSCP information queried by the
authentication server to an OSCP server and a Server Hello Done. At this point
the server waits for the client’s next step;
6. The client replies with his certificate and sends the Client Key Exchange. This
last message is a pre-master secret sent encrypted to the server (with its public
key) to computer a master secret. Also, the client sends a hash of all received and
sent messages to the server, signing it with its private key, to prove that it is the
legal owner of the identity present in the certificate. Finally, it sends a Change
Cipher Spec message (whose goal is to change the connection state, if needed)
and a Finished message;
7. And the server sends a Change Cipher Spec and Finished messages.
The process finishes with an EAP-Success message and both parties are authenticated.
In case EAP-TLS only performs server authentication, the client needs to be authenti-
cated and one of two possible scenarios can lead to that.
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Supplicant Authentication Server
EAP Identity Response
EAP-SH Ack
EAP-SH Initial Client Certificate Transmission
EAP-TLS Start
EAP-TLS Client Hello, Cert. Status Request
EAP-TLS Server Hello, Server Cert., Cert. Status, Server Done
Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher, Finished
EAP-TLS Change Cipher, Finished
EAP-TLS Ack
EAP-SH Start
Figure 4.8: EAP-SH Phase 1 Message Exchange - Failure
The first scenario is the scenario where the client certificate does not exist. On the
EAP-SH Initial Client Certificate Transmission message, the client sends a "null
certificate", a certificate with length equal to zero. The server, upon receiving this,
configures itself to not require a client certificate and starts the EAP-TLS process,
setting up a TLS tunnel that will be used between the client and the portal, encrypting
all data exchanged. Finally, the client receives an EAP-SH Start from the server. After
this, both server and client are ready for the Captive Portal phase to start.
The second scenario is the scenario where the client certificate is not valid. On
the EAP-SH Initial Client Certificate Transmission message, the client sends its
certificate. After this message, the server immediately performs the client certificate
validation, and if validated unsuccessfully, the server configures itself to not require a
client certificate and starts the EAP-TLS process. Apart from this, everything is the
same as in the first scenario.
Phase Two: Captive Portal
This phase features the captive portal’s transmission, credential information as well as
certificate information (CSR and a signed client certificate). For the captive portal’s
transmission, the exchange of HTTP messages between the client and the server implies
that there must be a TCP connection since HTTP is ran over this protocol. For this
reason, there were a couple of mechanisms designed for this to work. As the client
machine does not have an IP address, it cannot send and receive HTTP directly. The
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solution for this problem was pretty simple: perform encapsulation of HTTP messages
into EAP requests and responses. However, there was still a need to establish TCP
listening ports and for this:
• A socket on the client is instantiated and bound to a port, listening and accepting
TCP connections, objectively from the browser. This socket is instantiated as
long as this stage is active. The browser is automatically opened and forced to
establish a TCP connection and send a request for the captive portal through
this specific socket.
• A socket on the authentication server is instantiated and initiates a TCP connec-
tion with the HTTP server (note that the authentication server has an IP address
and so the HTTP server can be elsewhere than locally). This socket is used to
transmit and receive HTTP requests from both client and web server. When the
authentication server receives an HTTP request from the client (encapsulated in
EAP) the socket sends it to the HTTP server, receiving a response that can then
be fragmented over EAP and sent back to the client.
Figure 4.9 elucidates how this works.
Browser Supplicant
Access Point
RADIUS Server HTTP Server
HTTP
HTTP
over EAP
HTTP over
EAP over
RADIUS HTTP
Figure 4.9: EAP-SH Phase 2 - HTTP Protocol Mechanism
The following figures (Figures 4.10 and 4.11) describe in more detail how the message
exchange on this phase is processed.
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Supplicant Authentication Server Web Server
HTTP GET (over EAP)
HTTP GET
HTTP OK - Captive Portal
HTTP OK - Captive Portal (over EAP)
HTTP POST - Credentials (over EAP)
HTTP POST - Credentials
HTTP FOUND - Redirection
HTTP FOUND - Redirection (over EAP)
HTTP GET (over EAP)
HTTP GET
HTTP OK - Success Page
HTTP OK - Success Page (over EAP)
Figure 4.10: EAP-SH Phase 2 Message Exchange - Captive Portal Login Success
The packet exchange starts as soon as the client receives the EAP-SH Start. First
the client creates the socket bound to a port (as referred before) and then the client
opens a browser automatically, redirecting the HTTP request (GET) to the listening
port, establishing a TCP connection. Internally, the supplicant fragments the request
if necessary, and sends the fragments encapsulating them in EAP responses, one at a
time. On the first fragment of this message, the G bit (Figure 4.4) is set to indicate
the message is an HTTP request. Also, for each of these fragments, the corresponding
EAP-SH ACK is received. EAP-SH Ack is a message that has no payload and its flags
are all set to zero (similarly to EAP-TLS). For the last fragment, the server does not
reply with EAP-SH ACK but instead with the reply message he is supposed to (HTTP
OK or any message with a different HTTP code).
The server, after receiving all fragments, performs defragmenting on the request
message and sends it to the HTTP server through the created server socket, receiving
an HTTP response back with the captive portal contents. The authentication server
then fragments it, if necessary, and the process is repeated the same way as it does on
the client (note that the G bit is not set, for this is not an HTTP request).
Upon receiving the entire response and defragmenting it, the client replies (through
its socket) to the browser with the recently received response. The user introduces its
normal credentials onto the captive portal and sends a POST, encapsulated in EAP.
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The request reaches the authentication server, who then relays it to the web server. The
HTTP server then validates the credentials, consulting its user database, and sends a
page according to the result. On one hand, if the credentials are not valid, the web server
sends back the captive portal with an "authentication failed" message and the user
has the opportunity of submitting credentials again. On the other hand, if the creden-
tials are valid, the server sends back to the client a success page, as shown in Figure 4.10.
Both authentication server and supplicant need to have some signalling concern-
ing the authentication’s success by the web server. For that, the last HTTP message
comes with an additional HTTP header field, X-username, where the username is
inserted. This username is also used so the authentication server is aware of the current
user being accounted. In case this field is empty, the authentication was a failure.
Supplicant Authentication Server
Client Certificate Signing Request
Client Certificate
EAP-SH Ack
EAP Success
Figure 4.11: EAP-SH Phase 2 Message Exchange - Certificate Signing and Install
Considering a successful validation, a Certificate Signing Request is created by the
supplicant and sent to the authentication server, with proper fragmentation. This
CSR also contains the supplicant’s identity encrypted with the authentication server’s
public key, inserted on a specific field: Subject Alternative Name. Also, on the first
fragment of the message the C bit is set (Section 4.4) to indicate the content of the
message is a certificate. The authentication server, upon reception, signs the received
certificate with its CA private key and sends it back to the supplicant. From this point
on, the certificate is valid, for a number of days according to the certificate policy,
and the user can successfully be authenticated by the authentication server without
having to contact the captive portal. Finally, the server sends an EAP Success to
the authenticator, allowing access to the network as soon as the four-way handshake
is complete (to simplify we consider the authenticator and the supplicant the same
identity, in Figure 4.11).
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Five
Implementation
This chapter intends to give a detailed description about the solution’s implementation.
’I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000 ways that won’t work’, Thomas A. Edison
5.1 WPA Supplicant
As discussed before, the supplicant side on Linux is played by a daemon program
that controls the wireless networking called WPA Supplicant1. WPA Supplicant is a
cross-platform supplicant that supports WEP, WPA and WPA2, and it is the IEEE
802.1X component that is used in client stations. For this, it supports a wide vari-
ety of EAP methods2. The following steps are used when a machine associates to an AP:
1. WPA Supplicant requests the kernel network driver to scan neighbour BSS’s
(Basic Service Sets), identified by an SSID;
2. WPA Supplicant selects a BSS based on its configuration;
3. WPA Supplicant requests the kernel network driver to associate with the chosen
BSS;
4. If WPA-EAP (Enterprise environments): the 802.1X supplicant completes the
EAP authentication with the authentication server and a Master Session Key
(MSK) is generated;
5. If WPA-PSK (SOHO environments): WPA Supplicant uses Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
as the master session key;
6. WPA Supplicant completes the WPA 4-Way Handshake and Group Key Hand-
shake with the AP;
7. Data packets can now be received and sent.
WPA Supplicant is written in C language and in order to integrate our protocol, we
downloaded its source code with version 2.63. Each EAP method is implemented as
1http://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-devel.pdf
2https://linux.die.net/man/8/wpa_supplicant
3https://w1.fi/cgit
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a separate module, usually as one C file named "eap_<method_name>.c". All EAP
methods use the same interface between the supplicant state machine and method-
specific functions, and method registration is done through this interface, as shown on
Code Snippet 1.
int eap_peer_sh_register(void)
{
struct eap_method *eap;
eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_SH, "SH");
if (eap == NULL)
return -1;
eap->init = eap_sh_init;
eap->deinit = eap_sh_deinit;
eap->process = eap_sh_process
eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_sh_isKeyAvailable;
eap->getKey = eap_sh_getKey;
eap->get_status = eap_sh_get_status;
eap->has_reauth_data = eap_sh_has_reauth_data;
eap->deinit_for_reauth = eap_sh_deinit_for_reauth;
eap->init_for_reauth = eap_sh_init_for_reauth;
eap->getSessionId = eap_sh_get_session_id;
return eap_peer_method_register(eap);
}
Code Snippet 1: EAP-SH method registration
This allows new EAP methods to be added without modifying the core EAP state
machine implementation. Additionally, a new EAP type number had to be added to
the EAP type definitions. As of today, numbers 56 to 191 are unassigned4, and so we
chose to attribute to EAP-SH the type number 56. So, for EAP-SH integration, all we
needed to do was to create a C file and register its methods, declare its type number
and change the Makefiles to include the new C file.
As shown before, our protocol incorporates an EAP-TLS phase, similarly to PEAP or
TTLS. For that reason, we adapted the WPA Supplicant’s PEAP modules into our
protocol, incorporating functionalities to our created modules from PEAP and adding
4http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xhtml
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new ones according to our defined protocol architecture.
5.1.1 Configuration
WPA Supplicant is configured using a text file (wpa_supplicant.conf 5) that lists all
accepted networks and security policies. It can include one or more networks blocks,
that include all the necessary configuration for that network. Code Snippet 2 shows
configurations for two types of network: home network and enterprise network. Taking
a look at the enterprise network configuration, it is possible to configure the EAP
method as well as all the certificate information needed for EAP to work.
network={
ssid="home"
scan_ssid=1
key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
psk="passphrase"
}
network={
ssid="enterprise"
scan_ssid=1
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
pairwise=CCMP TKIP
group=CCMP TKIP
eap=TLS
identity="user@example.com"
ca_path="/etc/cert/"
client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem"
private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv"
private_key_passwd="password"
}
Code Snippet 2: Example of two network configurations: home and enterprise network
In our protocol, the network block comprises a number of fields that contain information
used when authenticating to a network. Code Snippet 3 shows a configuration example
of a network that uses EAP-SH for authentication:
• ssid: Sequence of characters that uniquely identifies a WLAN;
• key_mgmt: Accepted authenticated key management protocol;
• eap: EAP method used when authenticating to this network;
5https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/plain/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
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• identity: EAP peer identity, included on Response Identity message (can be
random);
• ca_path: Path pointing to the directory containing CA certificates files in an
OpenSSL format;
• client_cert (optional): Path to the client certificate file, in an OpenSSL
format. This file is optional, however it is used on the first phase of EAP-SH. In
case it is not present or invalid, a new is generated after performing authentication
and added to the file automatically;
• private_key (optional): Path to the client private key file, in an OpenSSL
format. It is added automatically along with the client certificate file.
network={
ssid="example-wifi"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=SH
identity="bob"
ca_path="/etc/ssl/certs/"
client_cert="/home/nuno/ssl/certs/nuno0.pem"
private_key="/home/nuno/ssl/privkeys/nuno0.pem"
}
Code Snippet 3: Network configuration using EAP-SH
5.1.2 Data structures
EAP-SH needs data structures in order to store state variables, necessary temporary
information or TLS data structures. The following code snippet shows our data structure
and its internal variables.
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struct eap_sh_data {
struct eap_ssl_data ssl;
eap_sh_state_t state; //new
int client_socket_fd; //new
int client_conn_socket_fd; //new
struct wpabuf *resp_out;
size_t resp_out_pos;
size_t resp_out_limit;
struct wpabuf *resp_in;
size_t resp_in_pos;
char* certificate; //new
char *username; //new
int no_certificate; //new
int send_certificate; //new
u8 *key_data;
u8 *session_id;
size_t id_len;
}
Code Snippet 4: EAP-SH Data Structure
• ssl: Stores TLS connection context data and buffers for TLS messages to be
fragmented or to be reassembled;
• state: State variable that stores the current state of the EAP-SH process
(explained further);
• client_socket_fd: Socket file descriptor pertaining to the socket that is listen-
ing to connections;
• client_conn_socket_fd: Socket file descriptor pertaining to the current con-
nection socket;
• resp_out: Buffer that stores the full EAP packet to be transmitted;
• resp_out_pos: Position on the buffer still left to be transmitted;
• resp_out_limit: Fragment maximum size;
• resp_in: Buffer that stores the full EAP packet currently being received;
• resp_in_pos: Position on the buffer still left to be received;
• certificate: Stores a generated Certificate Signing Request;
• username: Username (if the login is completed) to be included in the created
certificate, encrypted;
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• no_certificate: Indicates if there is no certificate, after parsing the configura-
tion file;
• key_data: Master secret used to encrypt the transmitted packets;
• session_id: Session identifier derived from TLS;
• id_len: Session identifier length;
5.1.3 EAP-SH Supplicant States
The supplicant needs to know on what point of the EAP-SH protocol it is so to respond
properly to the server. This is done through an internal state machine. The code
snippet below represents the list of all possible states.
typedef enum {
EAP_SH_SEND_FIRST_CERT,
EAP_SH_TLS,
EAP_SH_START_PHASE2,
EAP_SH_RECEIVING_CP_PAGE,
EAP_SH_CP_PAGE_COMPLETE,
EAP_SH_SENT_POST,
EAP_SH_RECEIVING_FAILURE_PAGE,
EAP_SH_RECEIVING_SUCCESS_PAGE,
EAP_SH_SUCCESS_PAGE_COMPLETE,
EAP_SH_FAILURE_PAGE_COMPLETE,
EAP_SH_RECEIVING_CERTIFICATE,
EAP_SH_CERTIFICATE_COMPLETE,
EAP_SH_DONE
} eap_sh_state_t;
Code Snippet 5: EAP-SH Supplicant States
EAP-SH starts on the EAP_SH_SEND_FIRST_CERT state. On this state, the supplicant
sends its certificate, and updates its state to EAP_SH_TLS, which means that the proto-
col is now processing the authentication request on the first phase (EAP-TLS phase).
As soon as the TLS tunnel is set up, and the certificate is invalid, the captive portal
phase starts (EAP_SH_START_PHASE2) and the HTTP packets from the portal page are
received and acknowledged until all are received (EAP_SH_CP_PAGE_COMPLETE). The
supplicant sends its credentials through an HTTP POST (EAP_SH_SENT_POST)
and it can either receive a success page (EAP_SH_SUCCESS_PAGE_COMPLETE)
or a failure page (EAP_SH_SUCCESS_PAGE_COMPLETE). On the latter, the
client can re-send its credentials, and so re-send an HTTP POST. On the
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first, the client generates a CSR, sends it, and expects receiving the certifi-
cate from the server (EAP_SH_RECEIVING_CERTIFICATE), until is it complete
(EAP_SH_CERTIFICATE_COMPLETE). Finally, the process terminates and the user
is successfully authenticated (EAP_SH_DONE).
When generating a CSR, a number of fields are initialized. Such fields, on our
implementation, are:
• Country: Client’s country of residence;
• Subject Alternative Name: Encrypted client’s identity;
• Public key: Certificate public key.
More information on these types of certificates can be stored by the client when
generating them (see Section 4.2.3), however only these three are considered on our
current implementation.
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RECEIVING
CP PAGE
CP PAGE
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SENT POST
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FAILURE PAGE
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Credentials
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page fragments
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Receiving certifi-
cate fragments
Received all cer-
tificate fragments
Install certificate
TLS done,
certificate valid
Figure 5.1: EAP-SH: Supplicant State Machine
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5.1.4 Fragmentation and Defragmentation
The Internet, as it is today, supports a maximum packet size for transmission, known
as the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). In most LANs, the MTU has a value of
1500 octets. For this reason, some protocols break and reassemble datagrams packets
in order to be transmitted in smaller pieces (known as fragments). These processes are
known as fragmentation and defragmentation.
On the first phase of EAP-SH, which corresponds to the setup of a TLS tunnel,
the fragmentation and defragmentation is based on the flags set on the transmitted
packet and so handled exclusively by EAP-TLS module. As referred on Section 4.2.1,
there are 2 bits on the Flags field of TLS that control these processes: the L bit
(Length Included bit), which generally is set on the first fragment, and the M bit
(More Fragments bit), which is set on all but the last fragment. Four scenarios can occur:
• Unique fragment: only the L bit is set;
• First fragment (not unique): both the M and L bits are set;
• Fragment (not first or last): only the M bit is set;
• Last fragment: no flags are set.
On the second phase of EAP-SH, the mechanism is exactly the same. Also, as seen on
Figure 5.1, the states are used to make the protocol process a message, when it is fully
received, such as a page or a certificate.
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5.2 RADIUS
The authentication server is implemented by a Remote Authentication Dial-In User
Service (RADIUS) server. RADIUS [16] is a protocol that provides centralized Authen-
tication, Authorization and Accounting management for users that connect and intend
to use a network service. FreeRADIUS6 is a popular open source RADIUS server and
it was the implementation used on our authentication server side, along with a MySQL
database to store usernames and accounting information. The whole server is written
in C language, and it supports a wide variety of protocols, which includes many EAP
authentication methods, such as EAP-TTLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-PEAP, EAP-AKA and
EAP-SIM.
Similarly to WPA Supplicant, adding EAP-SH to FreeRADIUS implied creating
a C file which implemented the EAP interface methods (such as instantiate and
process), rlm_eap_<method_name>.c, and an additional C file which implemented
the protocol’s logic, eap_<method_name>.c.
Also as in WPA Supplicant, in order to have a "head start", we also adapted
the freeRADIUS’s PEAP modules into our defined protocol architecture.
5.2.1 Configuration
In order to integrate our protocol, a FreeRADIUS development version was downloaded
from Github7 and the EAP configuration file was changed accordingly, located in the
modules folder. On this file, all the following configurations were inserted so to be
parsed when the EAP-SH module is initialized:
6http://freeradius.org/
7https://github.com/FreeRADIUS/freeradius-server/
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sh{
tls{
certificate_file = /etc/ssl/radiusServerCert.pem
private_key_file = /etc/ssl/radiusServerCertPrivKey.pem
private_key_password = "password"
ca_file = /etc/ssl/certs/CertAuthority.pem
captive_portal_loc = 192.168.1.4
staple {
enable = yes
override_cert_url = yes
url = "http://127.0.0.1/ocsp/"
}
}
valid_days = 7
}
Code Snippet 6: FreeRADIUS - EAP-SH Configuration
By configuration line:
• certificate_file: server certificate sent when authenticating himself through
TLS. Contains the certificate chain;
• private_key_file: file containing the server certificate private key;
• private_key_password: password to decrypt private key file;
• ca_file: server CA file, through which it validates the client certificate. Alter-
natively, instead of a single file, a path can be configured (with ca_path);
• enable (in staple): if ’yes’, enables OSCP stapling, explained in Section 4.2.3;
• override_cert_url: if ’yes’, the OSCP Responder URL is extracted from the
’url’ field from this file, instead of the default which is to be extracted from the
certificate;
• url: OSCP Responder URL
• valid_days: number of valid days the server signs the client Certificate Signing
Request;
5.2.2 Data Structures
EAP-SH has a lot of variables that need to be taken into account when processing a
message coming from the supplicant. For that, it possesses two data structures:
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typedef struct rlm_eap_sh_t {
fr_tls_conf_t *tls_conf;
int valid_days; //new
bool proceed_to_phase2; //new
bool no_certificate; //new
bool tls_start; //new
} rlm_eap_sh_t;
typedef struct eap_sh_session_t {
eap_sh_state_t state; //new
int valid_days; //new
size_t record_in_total_len;
size_t record_in_recvd_len;
bool record_in_started;
uint8_t *record_in;
size_t record_out_total_len;
size_t record_out_sent_len;
bool record_out_started;
uint8_t *record_out;
int* radius_socket_fd; //new
size_t fragment_size; //new
} eap_sh_session_t;
Code Snippet 7: FreeRADIUS - EAP-SH Data Structures
By variable:
• tls_conf: parsed tls configuration from file;
• valid_days: parsed valid days configuration from file;
• proceed_to_phase2: flag indicating if phase 2 should start;
• no_certificate: Flag containing the evaluation of the client’s certificate initial
validation;
• tls_start: Flag indicating when phase 1 (EAP-TLS) should start;
• state: State variable that stores the current state of the EAP-SH process on the
server (explained further);
• record_in_total_len: Total length of the incoming record (payload without
flags and length fields);
• record_in_recv_len: Total fragment length received of the incoming record;
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• record_in_started: Flag indicating if an incoming record is being received;
• record_in: Buffer that stores the incoming record;
• record_out_total_len: Total length of the outgoing record (payload without
flags and length fields);
• record_out_recv_len: Total fragment length sent of the outgoing record;
• record_out_started: Flag indicating if an outgoing record is being sent;
• record_out: Buffer that stores the outgoing record;
• radius_socket_fd: Socket file descriptor pertaining to the socket connecting to
the HTTP server;
• fragment_size: Outgoing packet’s fragment size;
5.2.3 EAP-SH Server States
Similarly to WPA Supplicant, our protocol also has an internal state machine on the
server in order to know how to reply to each received message from the supplicant. The
code snippet below lists all the possible states.
typedef enum {
EAP_SH_RECORD_RECV_FIRST,
EAP_SH_RECORD_RECV_MORE,
EAP_SH_RECORD_RECV_COMPLETE,
EAP_SH_RECORD_SENDING,
EAP_SH_RECV_FIRST_CERT,
EAP_SH_TLS,
EAP_SH_START_PHASE2,
EAP_SH_SENDING_PAGE,
EAP_SH_PAGES_SENT,
EAP_SH_RECEIVED_ACK,
EAP_SH_RECEIVED_REQUEST,
EAP_SH_RECEIVED_CERT_REQUEST,
EAP_SH_SENDING_CERTIFICATE,
EAP_SH_CERTIFICATE_SENT,
EAP_SH_SUCCESS,
EAP_SH_FAIL
} eap_sh_state_t;
Code Snippet 8: FreeRADIUS - EAP-SH RADIUS States
On the server side, after the initial certificate validation is done
(EAP_SH_RECV_FIRST_CERT), the server starts an EAP-TLS process (EAP_SH_TLS).
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Once the TLS tunnel is set, either the process ends successfully (EAP_SH_SUCCESS)
or the second phase starts (EAP_SH_START_PHASE2). On the latter case, the server
expects to receive an HTTP GET request and starts sending the captive portal page
(EAP_SH_SENDING_PAGE), until all page is sent (EAP_SH_PAGE_SENT). The authentica-
tion server expects one of three messages, at all times (see Section 4.2.1, Figure 4.4):
• Page Acknowledge (EAP_SH_RECEIVED_ACK): A fragment acknowledge sent by
the supplicant (with all flags set to 0);
• GET/POST Request(EAP_SH_RECEIVED_REQUEST): The supplicant can ask for
additional HTTP objects or send a POST (G flag is set);
• Certificate Request (EAP_SH_RECEIVED_CERT_REQUEST): A certificate signing
request is sent by the supplicant (C flag is set).
In response to the last fragment of the captive portal page, the client sends a POST
(with G flag set) and the server relays it to the HTTP server. From here, the authentica-
tion server sends a result page (EAP_SH_SENDING_PAGE) received from the web server,
after the latter validates the credentials. As soon as the whole page is sent, and the sup-
plicant is validated successfully (EAP_SH_PAGES_SENT), the server receives a Certificate
Signing Request (EAP_SH_RECEIVED_CERT_REQUEST), signs it and sends it back to
the client (EAP_SH_SENDING_CERTIFICATE and EAP_SH_CERTIFICATE_SENT). The
supplicant acknowledges the reception and the server sends an EAP Success message
(EAP_SH_SUCCESS).
At any time, should the server encounter some error or some inconsistency in
any exchanged message, the server sends back an EAP Failure (EAP_SH_FAIL).
Fragmentation and defragmentation is processed the same way as the supplicant
does, based on the EAP-SH flags. The first three states are used for defragmentation
purposes and the fourth state for fragmenting.
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Figure 5.2: EAP-SH: RADIUS State Machine
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5.2.4 HTTP Server
The freeRADIUS server is also responsible for communicating directly with the HTTP
server, serving as a proxy to the supplicant, decapsulating the HTTP packets, sending
them to the web server, receiving responses and encapsulating them in order to send
them back to the supplicant. The HTTP server can be located anywhere on the
Internet, as a normal server would.
This server was implemented with Apache HTTP Server8 and a minimal login
page was also implemented, shown in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Implemented Captive Portal
The server also holds a MySQL database to validate received POST messages containing
usernames and passwords against it.
8https://httpd.apache.org/
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Six
Security Analysis
This chapter intends to give an overall evaluation of the solution’s security, which means
if the implemented architecture meets the stated objectives of this thesis.
’Instead of focusing on the malware, focus on the attacker. He is greedy, he has weaknesses
and he makes mistakes.’, Shlomo Toubol
6.1 Dolev-Yao Model Conditions
It is necessary to do a protocol’s validation in order to know if it is secure, having
in account some realistic conditions. As we’ve seen before, the EAP-SH method is
effective against passive eavesdroppers, who simply monitor the communication and
try to decipher messages, since all traffic is encrypted and therefore well-protected.
However, we must also consider active eavesdroppers, who may be able to impersonate
an entity and may alter or replay messages. For this security analysis, we will assume
the Dolev-Yao Model [17] conditions. For that, we must initially make a few assumptions:
1. The public key system is perfect:
• Hash functions are unbreakable (non-invertible, collision-free);
• The public directory is secure and cannot be tampered;
• Everyone has access to all Ex, i.e., all the messages encrypted with entity X
public key;
• Only entity X knows Dx, i.e., only X knows how to decipher those messages.
2. Only the two entities who wish to communicate are involved in the transmission
process (encryption and decryption);
3. The same format is used for any pair of entities that wish to communicate;
4. The attacker has control over the entire network:
• He can obtain any message passing through the network;
• He is a legitimate user of the network, can initiate a conversation with any
party, or be a receiver to any party;
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6.1.1 Rogue Access Points
A rogue access point is a wireless AP installed on a secure network without any
authorization from that network’s administrator. This type of AP does not constitute
a threat, and as it only serves as a middleman it can only observe the traffic and is
not able to decrypt it. Furthermore, the AP can direct all the traffic to a malicious
server, that simulates the authentication server behaviour, but again the server must
be authenticated through TLS and fails to do so if it is a fraud. A rogue AP also
cannot communicate with the genuine authentication server because normally this
communication involves a shared secret that the rogue AP does not know.
6.1.2 Client Certificate Owner
The attacker may try to pass as the owner of the transmitted client (supplicant)
certificate, which can be used to obtain a valid authentication. For that, EAP-TLS
(EAP-SH phase 1) has a mechanism for the client to prove to the server that he
possesses the private key corresponding to its public key certificate. In other words,
that he is the owner of the sent certificate. The Certificate Verify message is a hash of
all the messages up to the point where the client sends its certificate and it is encrypted
with the client’s private key. The server verifies this signature with the public key,
which ensures that it was signed with the client’s private key. Through this mechanism,
it is impossible for the attacker to impersonate the client just by stealing his public key
certificate.
6.1.3 Server Certificate Owner
Server’s impersonation may be one way of obtaining the credentials from a client. For
this, an attacker might try to pass as the owner of the server certificate. In EAP-TLS,
the server can only generate the master secret if it decrypts a random secret sent by
the client and encrypted with the server’s private key. Only the legitimate server has
the private key and so only this server can generate the master secret (and its client).
Therefore, the server’s impersonator is not able to decrypt or encrypt data on the
resulting TLS tunnel.
6.1.4 Client Identity
In EAP-TLS, identity is generally sent without any protection and the attacker may
snoop on the identity, or even modify or spoof identity exchanges. To address these
threats, the client certificate sent to the server contains on its Subject Alternative
Name the identity (used for accounting purposes), encrypted with the server’s public
56
key. When the attacker captures the client certificate, he is not able to discover the
client’s identity, because only the server can decrypt it.
6.1.5 Captive Portal Circumvention
Normally an attacker who would like abusing the network would take advantage of
opened protocols in a hotspot environment. A very good example is encapsulating
TCP inside protocols such as DNS or ICMP. This implementation does not leave any
protocol prone to such abuse since the supplicant, before and during the authentication,
does not receive an IP address and so cannot tunnel any desired protocol. Furthermore,
the AP blocks all arbitrary communications with the network until a successful end of
the EAP-SH and a posterior four-way handshake.
6.1.6 Captive Portal Impersonation
An attacker can impersonate a captive portal in order to obtain a client’s credentials.
On this case, this attacker simulates, with a false AP, a captive portal similar to the
one a client uses when performing EAP-SH. Having that in account:
1. The supplicant must indicate that authentication is to be performed with EAP-SH,
refusing other hotspots without any security whatsoever;
2. The authentication’s server certificate is validated by the supplicant, preventing
therefore that the supplicant communicates directly with the false captive portal.
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Seven
Conclusion
This chapter presents a final conclusion about this thesis, describing the problem, the
solution and what is left as future work.
’It’s more fun to arrive a conclusion than to justify it.’, Malcolm Forbes
Public hotspots are potentially insecure networks found in just about any minimally
crowded place, such as shopping centres. Their usage increases every day, along with
their subscribers, who need to authenticate themselves in order to use network resources.
This type of authentication is done through a captive portal, which is a web page where
the user proves he is a subscriber by logging in using a username-password pair. Their
insecurity poses a threat as sensitive information circulate sometimes with no confi-
dentiality nor integrity control, among other problems specified in Sections 1.1 and 2.3.2.
The solution that we developed, EAP-SH, intends to take advantage of the 802.1X
architecture, and consists on the implementation of an EAP method (for the second
phase of 802.1X authentication) complemented with the captive portal paradigm.
This EAP method is performed in two stages: first the establishment of a TLS
tunnel; then an HTTP-based authentication via a captive portal. Most of the advan-
tages that this method provides repress the weaknesses of current hotspots’ architecture:
1. The first phase of the protocol allows mutual authentication, proving the legitimacy
of network and possibly the client, in case his certificate is successfully validated;
2. HTTP-based authentication is already familiar to users (logging into a captive
portal);
3. The establishment of a TLS tunnel allows exchanged data, including credentials,
to be encrypted and its integrity assured;
4. An installed client certificate, as a result of the process, may be valid for a defined
period of time. This means that for that same time, the client does not need to
perform HTTP-based authentications;
5. AP software modification is not needed;
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6. Harmful clients cannot abuse the network through the tunnelling of protocols.
As future work, we leave the study of how to adapt current captive portals’ in various
scenarios (such as stores, airports, shopping centres, cafés, domestic operator installa-
tions) into the exploration of EAP-SH. Also, it might be possible a future publication
of EAP-SH as an RFC.
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